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Abstract
Background: This paper discusses the role of public inquiries as an instrument of public policy-
making in New Zealand, using mental health as a case study. The main part of the paper analyses
the processes and outcomes of five general inquiries into the state of New Zealand's mental health
services that were held between 1858 and 1996.
Results: The membership, form, style and processes used by public inquiries have all changed over
time in line with constitutional and social trends. So has the extent of public participation. The
records of five inquiries provide periodic snapshots of a system bedevilled by long-standing
problems such as unacceptable standards, under-resourcing, and poor co-ordination. Demands for
an investigation no less than the reports and recommendations of public inquiries have been the
catalyst of some important policy changes, if not immediately, then by creating a climate of opinion
that supported later change. Inquiries played a significant role in establishing lunatic asylums, in
shaping the structure of mental health legislation, establishing and maintaining a national mental
health bureaucracy within the machinery of government, and in paving the way for
deinstitutionalisation. Ministers and their departmental advisers have mediated this contribution.
Conclusion: Public inquiries have helped shape New Zealand's mental health policy, both directly
and indirectly, at different stages of evolution. In both its advisory and investigative forms, the public
inquiry remains an important tool of public administration. The inquiry/cause and policy/effect
relationship is not necessarily immediate but may facilitate changes in public opinion with
corresponding policy outcomes long after any direct causal link could be determined. When
considered from that long-term perspective, the five inquiries can be linked to several significant
and long-term contributions to mental health policy in New Zealand.
Background
New Zealand's mental health policy and services have
evolved along similar lines to other "old Common-
wealth" countries. Like other British colonies of settle-
ment in the nineteenth century, New Zealand
endeavoured to adopt the progressive ideas of the non-
restraint system of care and treatment, along with its cor-
ollaries of special purpose residential institutions, medi-
cal management and separate legislation. Colonial
administrators and politicians preferred the English sys-
tem of institutional care over the Scottish mixed system of
lunatic asylums and boarding out or community care. The
concentration of specialised resources in residential care
facilities that were known at different times as lunatic asy-
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lums, mental hospitals or psychiatric hospitals isolated
them professionally, socially and administratively from
mainstream health and social services. Institutions
remained dominant until the late twentieth century, even
though the spectrum of mental health services widened in
response to demands for general hospital psychiatry from
the 1920s, community care from the 1960s and, more
recently, deinstitutionalization. The ebbs and flow of pol-
icy and service development in New Zealand, however, as
in many other countries, typify a classic feature of mental
health policy – alternating bursts of policy development
and funding interspersed with long periods of quiet incre-
mental change, indifference, or even stagnation. These
longstanding cycles make mental health an interesting
policy domain in which to study the impact of public
inquiries as an instrument of reform.
A public inquiry is a relatively independent investigation
that considers facts and evidence on some assigned topic,
draws conclusions, and reports, usually with recommen-
dations. An inquiry is publicly accountable to the New
Zealand Parliament or to the executive branch of govern-
ment, most usually the Governor-General (the Queen's
representative), government, minister, or some senior
official, according to the status of the inquiry.
The public inquiry is a very versatile tool of public admin-
istration and remains part of the apparatus of government
in various Commonwealth jurisdictions. There has been a
distinct shift from inquiries by parliamentary select com-
mittees towards executive-appointed inquiries since mid-
Victorian times as the device has evolved within the West-
minster constitutional system.[1-3] The executive-
appointed inquiry was legitimated in New Zealand in
1867 and is now the basis of most inquiries. Such inquir-
ies can be initiated by the government, (royal commis-
sions and commissions of inquiry), ministers of the
Crown (committees of inquiry), statutory agencies or offi-
cials. Royal commissions are generally held to have
greater prestige and standing than other forms of investi-
gation, and they have been used traditionally to inquire
into topics of outstanding public importance. Royal com-
missions are of medieval origin. The Governor-General of
New Zealand appoints them in the Queen's name. Com-
missions of inquiry are constituted by an Order in Coun-
cil under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908. The
Governor-General acts on the advice of ministers in mak-
ing appointments to either type of inquiry. Many Acts of
Parliament vest statutory bodies with the powers of a
commission of inquiry.
The Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908 and amendments
give a properly constituted inquiry wide powers to con-
duct proceedings, summon witnesses, call and take evi-
dence on oath, inspect and examine documents, or to
require them to be produced. Some modern inquiries
have undertaken or commissioned their own research.
The cost of an inquiry depends upon its duration, the
number of members, the size of the secretariat, the
amount of travel for hearings or site visits, or the use of
overseas experts, counsel and technical advisers. A very
comprehensive manual – the latest procedural guidance
to New Zealand inquiries prepared since 1925 – is mind-
ful of the growing body of precedent and inquiry-related
jurisprudence.[4]
Some scholars in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada
and New Zealand have been interested in the general pol-
icy-making role of inquiries. Theses by Alan Simpson
(1972) and Deborah Iversen (1992) are the best general
source of information about public inquiries in New Zea-
land. Their research shows an enormous range of topics
considered by inquiries. Published checklists do not
include every public inquiry held in New Zealand.[5,6]
Some newsworthy incident, revelation, or a level of public
disquiet that makes an issue politically sensitive usually
triggers an inquiry. Setting up an inquiry allows for an
issue to be carefully considered for a time without disrupt-
ing the regular administration of government. An inquiry
has prestige, legal authority to obtain information and it
can provide some protection to parties. Membership can
be determined according to the nature of the issue. In
some cases, representatives of particular interest groups
might be brought together to facilitate consensus-build-
ing; in others, respected arbiters may be needed. Much of
an inquiry's work is publicly visible. The invitational and
participative approach of a modern inquiry widens the
input to government policy-making.
An inquiry is relatively free within certain parameters to
interpret its mandate, determine how it will gather infor-
mation, formulate its arguments, organise its report, and
make recommendations as it chooses. The membership,
terms of reference, and duration of an inquiry – all of
which are determined by the minister or government of
the day – affect the degree of independence.
Ad hoc and temporary, an inquiry is said by Hallett to
arise suddenly, like a mushroom and to vanish just as sud-
denly, once it has presented or forwarded its report to the
initiating public body or official.[7] An inquiry's report is
then analysed by officials and ministers, who decide how
to handle the recommendations. The report is usually
published. A number have been tabled and printed in the
parliamentary papers.
A public inquiry serves an advisory or investigative func-
tion. An advisory inquiry addresses a broad issue of public
policy. An investigatory inquiry establishes the facts ofAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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some incident or tragedy. The distinction between advi-
sory and investigative inquiries is not always clear-cut.
Investigation of an incident may lead to consideration of
the policy context. The study of policy may expose abuses
or mistakes.[8,9] Simpson claims that the great majority
of inquiries in New Zealand have been investigative.[10]
That is certainly so for mental health inquiries. Significant
examples of investigative inquiries in this field include
inquiries into abuse and ill-treatment at the Wellington
Lunatic Asylum (1881), structural defects and faulty work-
manship at Seacliff Lunatic Asylum (1888), suicide at
Ashburn Hall licensed house (1896), a tragic fire at Sea-
cliff Mental Hospital (1943), short-staffing in mental hos-
pitals (1946), the administration of Oakley Hospital,
Auckland (1971), the state of forensic psychiatry services
(1987), and the death of a person being taken into psychi-
atric care (1994). My analysis of mental health inquiries
held between 1987 and 1995 showed that these were also
investigative. Investigative inquiries provide a sort of 'rit-
ual cleansing' as a former New Zealand top mental health
official once put it.[11] On the other hand, the spate of
investigatory mental health inquiries in recent years has
raised hints about the futility of 'another cycle of Inquiry
[sic] fatigue,' a standpoint warranted, perhaps, by mixed
evidence about the outcomes of earlier investigative
inquiries.[12]
New Zealand's general mental health inquiries
Five general or policy-advisory inquiries have been con-
ducted into the state of mental health services (as that
term was understood at the time) since the institution of
parliamentary government in New Zealand in 1854. They
were the
• Select Committee of the House of Representatives on a
General Lunatic Asylum (1858),
• Joint Parliamentary Committee on Lunatic Asylums
(1871),
• Board of Health Committee on Psychiatric Services in
Public Hospitals (1957–60),
• Royal Commission on Hospital and Related Services
(1972–3), and the
• [Ministerial] Inquiry in respect of Certain Mental Health
Services (1995–6).
The full titles encompass the main forms of inquiry avail-
able under New Zealand law. These inquiries will be
referred to hereafter by their abbreviated title. The nature
and number of advisory mental health inquiries can be
confidently established from a study of published official
records. A sixth, the Committee of Inquiry into Mental
Defectives and Sex Offenders (1924–25), would have
been included had it interpreted 'mental defective' to
include mental illness as well as what is nowadays usually
called intellectual handicap or intellectual disability.
Some other advisory inquiries have touched incidentally
on mental health matters, e.g., those set up to investigate
law and order, social security, or government administra-
tion. Such inquiries are not included in this study.
Methods
The study was undertaken by reviewing the literature on
the evolution, functioning and achievements of public
inquiries as an instrument of government policy-making
in New Zealand and comparable Commonwealth juris-
dictions. The research on the five mental health inquiries
used standard historical method based on published and
unpublished official records. The New Zealand Parliamen-
tary Debates provided the political context of each inquiry.
The reports of three inquiries were published in the Appen-
dices to the Journals of the House of Representatives and the
others were published separately by the Department/Min-
istry of Health. Terms of reference and membership of
some public inquiries were published among the official
notices of government in the New Zealand Gazette.
Records from the five inquiries have survived among the
archives of the Legislative Department, the Department of
Internal Affairs (which has general responsibility for the
administration of public inquiries), and the departments
of state responsible at different times for national mental
health policy: the Lunatic Asylums (1876–1905)/Mental
Hospitals (1905–1947) Department, and the Department
(1947–1992)/Ministry (since 1992) of Health. The Divi-
sion of Mental Hygiene or Mental Health (1947–1992)
provided a particular focus within the Department of
Health, as has the Mental Health Section or Directorate in
the Ministry of Health. The records and reports of each
inquiry provide rich sources of material. Unpublished
records of an inquiry may include the warrant of appoint-
ment, a transcript of proceedings, manuscript and printed
reports, and administrative and financial correspondence.
Official records have been augmented by reference to con-
temporary press comment. Archives of the Legislative
Department and Internal Affairs Departments and those
of some provincial governments were accessed to provide
information on the follow-up to the inquiries of 1858 and
1871. The Department of Health Archives were used to
obtain comprehensive information about the extent of
bureaucratic influence over later inquiries. Records of the
Ministry of Health concerning the Ministerial Inquiry of
1995–6 have not used because of the likely sensitivity and
topicality of those events.
Results
In this section, I will outline the background of each of the
five inquiries, the membership, duration, procedures, andAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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outcome. I will then consider how each inquiry contrib-
uted to national mental health policy.
Select Committee (1858)
Insanity was scarcely anticipated as a public policy matter
when New Zealand became a British colony in 1840. The
earliest known insane persons came to official attention
because they posed a threat to public safety, could not
safely look after themselves, or because they had no fam-
ily to care for them. Care of such persons fitted the gener-
ally accepted purposes of colonial government and the
civilising mission of British imperialism. The foundation
documents of the new colony anticipated a system of law
and order that was gradually established in the principal
Pakeha (European immigrant) settlements. The colony's
first mental health legislation, the Lunatics Ordinance
1846, limited disposition of a lunatic to a gaol, house of
correction, or public hospital until the person was dis-
charged or transferred to a 'public colonial lunatic asy-
lum'. Lunatics who were not dangerous were a secondary
concern. This pragmatic approach was typical of other
British colonies, but it had its drawbacks. Opinion-makers
considered improvised care in gaols or public hospitals as
inhumane, inadequate and administratively irksome. A
'community care' option of boarding out or repatriation
was rarely used, except perhaps for Maori.
Colonial authorities took their lead from the imperium
where a burst of activity had consolidated a policy frame-
work in England during the 1840s. The state regulated
admissions and discharges through a process now known
as committal. Marketplace activities were publicly moni-
tored. A chain of public lunatic asylums was under con-
struction across the country. A specialised bureaucracy
was set up to inspect facilities and to set standards. This
framework was gradually adapted to the circumstances of
constituent parts of the realm and of the settler colonies.
Given the cultural background of the British settlers, in
essence, the choice lay between the English model of luna-
tic asylums or the Scottish mixed model of institutions
and grant-aided boarding out of suitable patients with pri-
vate families. In the ensuing debate, the ideals of a prop-
erly designed lunatic asylum were invariably upheld,
complete with a system of patient classification, a safe,
healthy and orderly environment, and a regime of moral
management, which included minimal physical restraint.
By 1858, New Zealand politicians favoured the English
system of institutional care over the Scottish mixed
model. The systemic policy issue to be investigated was
the best way to provide a proper lunatic asylum. The ideal
was widely respected but of the eight provinces, only Wel-
lington had actually built such an institution by 1858.
With the small number of lunatics in each province and
with a national total of 50–100 chronic lunatics (depend-
ing on whether official returns or political estimates were
used), the idea of a central asylum for the whole colony
made sense to provincial politicians on the grounds of
humanity and efficiency. The financial argument – that a
colonial facility might relieve the provinces of financial
responsibility – hinted at the underlying political
dynamic. The provincial system (1852–76) created inher-
ent tensions between the relative responsibilities, author-
ity and fiscal powers of provincial governments and the
central government. Provincialism was intended to
address demands for a measure of self-government in the
isolated and scattered settlements of the colony. Finan-
cially struggling provinces, however, quickly learned how
hard it was to discharge their responsibility to provide
adequate and acceptable care for lunatics. In such circum-
stances, transferring responsibility to the central govern-
ment was attractive to the provinces.
The Select Committee's membership reflected this politi-
cal dynamic. Four of the six provinces were represented on
the 8-person committee. Every member had been
involved in provincial politics and five held concurrently
parliamentary and provincial seats. EW (later Sir Edward)
Stafford, for example, was both a provincial and national
politician and took a lead as a member of the Select Com-
mittee. As Premier and Colonial Secretary (the minister
nominally responsible for lunacy policy and legislation),
he personally followed up the Select Committee's
report.[13] Only two committee members – one a magis-
trate and the other a medical practitioner – were profes-
sionally acquainted with the problem of lunacy.
The Select Committee heard evidence from medical prac-
titioners and from those in charge of the local gaol and
hospital at Auckland, the then capital. Politicians with
some knowledge of the situation in other provinces were
also examined. The Select Committee used a standard
form of questioning and it kept an unpublished verbatim
record of evidence by the 14 selected witnesses.[14] The
Select Committee took two and one-half months to com-
plete its work and submitted a two page report.
Although the Select Committee was apprised of the Scot-
tish model, the weight of evidence favoured an institu-
tional approach. Some of the six recommendations (see
Table 1) embodied the contemporary ideals of a lunatic
asylum, purpose-built for the non-restraint system that
was a hallmark of leading English asylums. A comprehen-
sive but stand-alone legal framework for lunacy was also
recommended. The Stafford government adopted these
ideas although they were not immediately imple-
mented.[15-18] After a change of government in 1861,
planning for the central asylum ceased in favour of the
establishment of a network of provincial asylums. When
Stafford again became the Premier (1865–9), he astutelyAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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Table 1: Implementation of General Mental Health Inquiry Recommendations, 1858–1996
INQUIRY KEY RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION
Select Committee (1858)
Establish colonial lunatic asylum. Accepted 1858 but not implemented.
Appoint commissioner to choose site. Implemented 1858.
Obtain expert advice on asylum design and 
organisation.
Implemented 1858.
Adopt comprehensive and liberal treatment in 
asylum.
Accepted and applied variably by provinces.
Amend lunacy law. Implemented 1858.
Revise lunacy law entirely. Implemented 1867–8.
Joint Committee (1871)
General government to ensure proper 
provision for lunatics where provision 
inadequate.
Limited to guidelines before 1876 and direct 
management of asylums afterwards.
Appoint specialist psychiatrist to supervise and 
control all asylums.
Implemented 1876.
Obtain more information before making 
decision about central asylum.
Implemented 1872–4.
Improve all asylums, especially Karori 
(Wellington).
Left to provincial governments.
Board of Health Committee (1957–60)
Increase general hospital acute psychiatric beds 
in four main cities immediately.
Implemented progressively under hospital 
capital works programme.
Develop regional psychiatric units and 
outpatient clinics in 6 other cities.
Implemented – first unit opened 1963. 
Divisional outpatient services expanded as 
staffing permitted.
Establish staff in the units as per staff: patient 
ratios.
[Implemented].
Establish child psychiatry units in four main 
centres when staff available.
Adopted but implemented through child health 
clinics.
Intensify specialist staff recruitment. Ongoing implementation.
Second mental hospital staff to psychiatric 
units.
Implemented for first units then phased out.
Improve public attitudes towards mental illness. Accepted. Intensified public relations with 
World Mental Health Year 1960.
Relax legal restrictions on patients' personal 
rights.
Implemented 1961.
Royal Commission (1972–3)
First report Continue mental health lead by way of 
allowance.
Adapted.
Improve psychiatric hospital staffing to 
eliminate need for pay differential.
Accepted.
Set up independent study of poor working 
conditions that affect staff shortages.
Adapted then rejected 1975.
Review differential conditions of employment. Implemented.
Review entry requirements to encourage 
recruitment of male psychiatric nurses.
Reviewed for more consideration.
Study extent of recruitment problem. Adapted then rejected 1975.
Second report Establish national Institute of Psychiatry. Referred for consideration by key agencies.
Advise those concerned without delay. Implemented.
Third report Undertake national survey of service needs of 
mentally handicapped patients in psychiatric 
hospitals.
Implemented 1973–4.
Progressively move multiple-handicapped 
patients to general hospital care.
Deferred pending survey results.
Care for dual diagnosis or behaviourally 
disturbed mentally handicapped patients in 
general or psychiatric hospitals.
Deferred pending survey results.
Develop appropriate placements at home in 
foster home, community house or small special 
purpose institution.
Deferred pending survey results.
Discontinue practice of placing mentally 
handicapped patients in psychiatric hospitals.
Deferred pending survey results.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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upheld that decentralised approach.[19] The central gov-
ernment retained legislative responsibility, set a few
standards, and published the reports of provincial inspec-
tors, but was otherwise reluctant to interfere in what had
become by then a recognised provincial domain.
Joint Committee (1871)
By 1871, most provinces had built their own public luna-
tic asylum or were well on the way to doing so. Asylums
in the gold-rich provinces achieved very creditable stand-
ards, but slower developing and cash-strapped provinces
lagged behind. Only the smallest provinces still relied on
makeshifts or made extra-territorial arrangements with
asylums in other provinces. From the late 1860s, asylum
standards were sucked into wider political moves towards
nationally uniform standards and policies developed and
monitored by new departments of the central govern-
ment. Provincialism was waning although it remained a
potent force in some parts of the colony, hence represen-
tation of all save the two smallest provinces on the Joint
Committee.
The Legislative Council (upper house) established this
inquiry because this body took a consensual though elitist
interest in lunatics as one group in society who carried no
political weight.[20] Dr A Buchanan, MLC (Otago Prov-
ince), a key proponent of lunacy reform and chairman of
the Joint Committee, believed that less than half-a-dozen
parliamentarians held the cause of lunacy reform 'ear-
nestly at heart'. Most of those were members of the Legis-
lative Council. Four were medically qualified, and
another lay member was the Inspector of Asylums in
Otago. These members took a very active role in the work
of the Committee, and spoke authoritatively and knowl-
edgeably about progressive practice from their personal
visits to provincial and English asylums.[21-23] Bucha-
nan could not find the same enthusiasm among members
of the House of Representatives (lower house). Joint
Committee members from the Legislative Council con-
tributed strongly to parliamentary debates on the topic,
but committee members from the lower house did not
show the same zeal. The mover was the only member who
participated, and even he showed little sustained inter-
est.[24] Buchanan was upset by the indifference of elected
representatives whom, he said, would let the weakest sec-
tions of society go to 'the wall' for the sake of retrench-
ment.[25] He shared his opinions freely and forcibly with
an eminent Scottish psychiatrist:
We are willing enough to 'go in' for reproductive Public
Works. But, of course, the care of the Insane costs money,
and does not 'pay.' [26]
Like the Select Committee, the Joint Committee had to
meet and complete its work during the short parliamen-
tary session that typically lasted three months. In five
weeks, the Joint Committee heard from five invited wit-
nesses, four of them local asylum doctors. The Joint Com-
mittee submitted the briefest report: one sentence
criticised the current situation and four more set out the
recommendations. The transcript of evidence was pub-
lished as an attachment.[27]
The Joint Committee called for improvement in all asy-
lums, and looked to the general government to make
proper provision for lunatics through the appointment of
a specialist psychiatrist who would supervise and control
all lunatic asylums. The Joint Committee also recom-
Transfer responsibility for mental handicap 
services from Health to Social Welfare 
Department.
Adapted for inter-departmental consultation.
Place moratorium on psychopaedic hospital 
development.
Implemented 1973.
Discontinue hospital model of care for mentally 
handicapped.
Addressed through national needs survey.
Actively promote measures to prevent mental 
handicap.
Required further investigation.
Teach medical students modern views on 
management of mental handicap.
Required further investigation.
Urgently support home care, IHC facilities, 
small homes and hostels under national plan.
Accepted in part but subject to needs survey 
results.
Ministerial Inquiry (1995–6) Inquiry team should monitor implementation of 
its recommendations.
Rejected.
Increase mental health funding between $125–
140 M. over 5 years.
Adapted.
Ring-fence mental health funding. Rejected.
Establish Mental Health Commission and 
National Advisory Board.
Adapted.
Request MHC to prepare national blueprint for 
mental health services.
Implemented 1998.
Table 1: Implementation of General Mental Health Inquiry Recommendations, 1858–1996 (Continued)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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mended that more information be obtained before a deci-
sion was made about whether or not to proceed with a
central asylum for the colony. The recommendations were
adopted by the Legislative Council, but not by the
House.[28,29] The government stalled. Expert advice was
sought from Dr E Paley, Victoria's Inspector of Asylums,
who visited New Zealand asylums in 1872.[30] Paley
rejected the central asylum, but supported the idea of a
specialised national inspectorate. He went further by sug-
gesting that resident medical superintendents should be
appointed to run larger asylums and that they should have
a proper complement of attendants based on a staffing
formula.[31] Paley's report was not published until 1874,
the same year that financial provision was first made for
the national inspectorate.[32] The inspector's job was
advertised in Britain in 1875 and the appointee, Dr FWA
Skae, took up his duties as first head of the Lunatic Asy-
lums Department in July 1876.[33,34]
Skae's appointment reflected the government's decision
that lunacy administration should revert to the central
government in the redistribution of government activity
when the provincial administrations were abolished in
1876. A department of state was set up to advise ministers
on policy, to run and inspect public asylums, and later to
regulate the country's only licensed house (private mental
hospital). Under a near century of departmental adminis-
tration until 1972, the country's psychiatric services
slowly became characterised by national uniformity, a vir-
tual bureaucratic monopoly, separatism from mainstream
health services, and a predominantly institutional mind-
set. These features were compounded by fickle public atti-
tudes and the low political-fiscal priority given to mental
health. Multiple pressures of overcrowding, large num-
bers of long-term residents, and severe staff shortages per-
sisted long after a general therapeutic despair disappeared
with the advent of electro-convulsive therapy and tran-
quillisers in the 1940s and 1950s.
Institutions were the cornerstone of psychiatric care and
treatment in the New Zealand throughout this period, as
they were in western countries generally. Institutions
expanded in size thanks to elastic social and medical def-
initions of insanity. The number of institutions also grew
as rail and road systems opened up new regions to settle-
ment. After years of discussion, the name mental hospital
was officially adopted in 1905 to replace the outmoded
nomenclature of lunatic asylums. In its fullest sense, the
specialised mental hospital came to incorporate 'recep-
tion homes' and other residential facilities for early treat-
ment (after 1898) which patients were encouraged to
enter voluntarily following a law change in 1911. Villa-
style accommodation for long-term patients, which
aspired to regain the rustic appeal and quasi-domestic
scale of early asylum ideals, was another feature of the
mental hospital. The villa principle was intrinsic to all
new institutions from 1903. Community amenities like
halls, libraries, canteens, and sports fields, were later addi-
tions. The mental hospital was also identified with spe-
cialists in psychiatry, and a cadre of professionally trained
mental nurses rather than attendants. The new model
attempted to capture the therapeutic glamour and favour-
able public image of general hospitals, which were run by
ad hoc local authorities known as hospital boards.
Progress towards these lofty ideals was halting, patchy and
a reflection on the low political priority of mental health.
A significant credibility gap emerged between the ideals
and the realities of overcrowded and short-staffed facili-
ties. Outmoded design features and environments of
those Victorian era institutions that were built in perma-
nent materials hampered progress towards more modern
approaches. A general inquiry was called for in 1903
when the overall policy of a long-serving departmental
head seemed outdated. [35] Although the government
successfully resisted the pressure, reforms were expedited.
A deputy inspector-general was appointed, and that gave
fresh impetus to reformist policies. That deputy, who was
promoted to run the Department in 1907, himself
became stale and tired by 1925. His dogged pursuit of a
policy of mental hospitalisation did not match post-war
pressure for a fresh approach based on intermediate facil-
ities that would avoid the stigma of mental hospitals.
Pressure for an inquiry in 1925 was only averted by a
package of overdue reforms, including the establishment
of the first outpatient services and observation wards in
general hospitals.[36]
The establishment and extension of outreach services,
however, fluctuated and was very haphazard. Progress was
dependent upon the initiative and priority of local hospi-
tal boards and the availability of hard-pressed institu-
tional psychiatrists, whose first priority had to be to
mental hospital patients committed to their charge.
Under the first Labour Government's Social Security Act
1938, the full cost of care and treatment in mental hospi-
tals (1939) and general hospitals (1941), among other
health benefits, was met from taxation rather than patient
fees. Public expectations of the public hospital system
were heightened by the ideals of that legislation, by signif-
icant progress in biomedical technology, and years by
post-war prosperity. The financial effects of these changes
foreshadowed the government's assumption of national
capital planning procedures and the full cost of operating
all public hospitals in 1957.
Board of Health Committee (1958–60)
By the 1950s, the patchy growth of general hospital psy-
chiatry was less tolerable to informed opinion in some
hospital boards and the press. The groundswell of criti-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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cism was sufficient to prompt the next inquiry.[37-40]
Elected politicians were receptive to this groundswell, but
the real political actors were the health bureaucrats. Man-
aged devolution was their agenda: how to expand periph-
eral services without eclipsing the paramountcy of
institutional services.
As a technical/advisory committee, the Board of Health
Committee was the only inquiry with a very high level of
professional input. The committee's membership was
stacked with senior health officials and long-standing
hospital board politicians. This mix was probably
designed to anticipate and manage one member, Dr W.
Ironside, an academic psychiatrist whose views on general
hospital psychiatric services and curbs on mental hospital
growth were well in advance of prevailing official opin-
ion. This member seems to have negotiated the right to
record his views separately in a personal submission,
which was included in the committee's report. This device
made for a unanimous report, but it also provides a tanta-
lising glimpse of tensions within the committee, which
had trouble getting its members together. Internal dissent
delayed completion of the 27-page report. The Minister's
comments took 9 months to appear.[41]
The Board of Health Committee allowed 'certain national
bodies and organisations interested in this matter' to
make submissions, a procedure that effectively managed
debate without exposing official institutional orthodoxy
to the ideologies of pressure groups [42]. The committee
was 'particularly impressed' with the opinions of the Brit-
ish Medical Association and the medical superintendents
of general and mental hospitals, who had been sent a
questionnaire by the committee.[43]
Departmental officers drafted the report and completely
dominated a board sub-committee that rearranged the
final recommendations.[44] These called for an immedi-
ate increase in the number of acute psychiatric beds in the
four metropolitan general hospitals and the development
of inpatient and outpatient services in six other cities.
These units were to be staffed seconded from mental hos-
pitals according to appropriate staff-patient ratios. The
report recommended the establishment of specialised
child psychiatry units in the four main cities when staff
were available. Other recommendations were of a more
general nature, for example, increased recruitment of spe-
cialist staff, improved public attitudes and a relaxation of
restrictions on patients' personal rights.
The main recommendations accorded with departmental
interests and were shaped by officials. Ironside's ideas
were sidelined because the committee accepted a major
and ongoing role for departmental institutions, which
was the long-held view of the Department's Mental
Hygiene Division. The Division could therefore accept
general hospital units provided that the Division staffed
them.[45] Implementation was reasonably successful
although it took some years to fully implement some
ideas.
Royal Commission (1972–3)
The threat to institutional dominance in the spectrum of
psychiatric services was compounded after 1965 by moves
to integrate the administration of psychiatric and general
public hospitals under local hospital boards. This culmi-
nated in industrial action by institutionally-based psychi-
atric nurses, who were apprehensive of the possible effects
of the imminent transfer upon their pay and working con-
ditions. Local management difficulties at Oakley Hospi-
tal, Auckland, compounded the uncertainty and led to a
commission of inquiry in 1971. Meanwhile, the Public
Service Association, the staff union, pressed for a public
inquiry into mental health services generally.
The Department resisted this pressure and recommended
a wider and three-stage inquiry after the Medical Associa-
tion of New Zealand (formerly the New Zealand Branch
of the British Medical Association) lobbied the Minister.
Terms of reference were cobbled together from a contem-
porary Canadian royal commission.[46] The full title of
the Royal Commission consciously echoed that of a major
departmental policy statement, A Review of Hospital and
Related Services (1969), which was premised on the notion
of integrated health care administration. The Royal Com-
mission was one of a number set up by the weary National
government, which had been in power since 1960, in its
final term of office (1969–72). The political timeframe
shelved a hot industrial issue well beyond the dates of the
proposed transfer and the 1972 general election.
The government caucus was consulted before Cabinet
made a final decision on the membership of the Royal
Commission whose composition offers an interesting
insight into the trade-offs among experience, skills, objec-
tivity and outlook sought by the Government [47]. Sir
Keith Holyoake, the then Prime Minister (1960–72), said
of the Royal Commission:
You look round to find some psychiatric bloke – he would
be biased in one way or the other. As far as he could see –
and this was not for the record or for quoting – he would
rather have the best laymen available.[48]
The appointment of a distinguished lawyer or judge, in
this case, a Queen's Counsel, to head the inquiry, fol-
lowed convention. In keeping with another general trend,
previous experience as an inquiry member was sought
[49]. The appointment of CP Hutchinson, QC as chair of
the Royal Commission rapidly followed the completionAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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of his commission of inquiry into Oakley Hospital.
Another member of the Royal Commission, J Turnbull,
had served on the Royal Commissions on State Services
(1961–62) and Social Security (1969–2). Turnbull's
appointment may also have been intended to appease
psychiatric nurses, because he was a retired national secre-
tary of the Public Service Association. The Royal Commis-
sion's membership was criticised for including 'a director
of Watties [a major food processing business] and ... a
National Party City Councillor' but no nurse, as was first
envisaged.[50] The sole medical practitioner on the Royal
Commission was not a psychiatrist.
The warrant gave the Royal Commission 28 months to
complete its tasks, as befitted the wide mandate of such a
prestigious body. In all probability, that time frame would
have been unmanageable because of the clumsy three-
stage reporting framework. The Royal Commission was
asked first to investigate a highly specific industrial issue,
then to study psychiatric services, and finally to study the
wider hospital system. The possible complications of an
approach that moved from the specific to the general than
vice versa were foreseen but not changed.[51] The Royal
Commission received some 90 submissions. Nearly all
came from the mental health and health establishment.
The Royal Commission completed a report on stage one
but was only part way through stage two when it was
wound up prematurely in 1973. The warrant of dissolu-
tion cited 'certain events' which had happened after the
Royal Commission was appointed, a cryptic allusion to
the change of government in late 1972, that was the real
reason [52]. The incoming Labour Minister of Health, RJ
Tizard, took the view that governments should be proac-
tive and not forestall action by setting up inquiries.[53]
The new government wanted to implement its own ideas
through a closed-system of considering departmental sub-
missions to its caucus health committee. Abolishing the
inquiry suited top departmental officials. They were irri-
tated by the uncomfortable relationship with the Royal
Commission, its seeming information overload, and by
the way the inquiry's proceedings were hogged by one
party with an antagonistic attitude towards the Depart-
ment.[54]
The Royal Commission completed the first part of its
investigation on the 'mental health lead' or differential
pay scale that favoured psychiatric and psychopaedic
(intellectual handicap) hospital nurses over general hos-
pital nurses. The Royal Commission recommended con-
tinued payment of the lead by way of allowance but that
psychiatric hospital staffing should be improved to elimi-
nate the need for the differential. The report also called for
a study of various factors that affected the recruitment and
retention of nursing staff in psychiatric hospitals, such as
poor working conditions or the entry criteria for male
nursing students.
Just before it was abolished, the Royal Commission pub-
lished two more but very slender reports. The second was
termed 'an immediate interim report', and recommended
the setting up of a national post-graduate institute of psy-
chiatry to boost the recruitment and retention of psychia-
trists.[55] The third report concerned provision for
mentally handicapped persons. The third report con-
cerned provision for mentally handicapped persons. The
Royal Commission's criticisms of existing model of care
were shown in recommendations for a moratorium on
the capital development of psychopaedic hospitals, for a
national survey of psychopaedic hospital patients, for the
development of a range of alternative general hospital and
community based facilities, and for the transfer of admin-
istrative responsibility for mental handicap within gov-
ernment from health to social welfare. The very brevity of
this third and 'final' report shows that it must have been
prepared from a preliminary draft report on the same sub-
ject.[56] Neither report did justice to the 'comprehensive
report' on mental health services envisaged for stage two
of the inquiry.
The Department was embarrassed by all of the Royal
Commission's reports. The first report cut across depart-
mental arguments for salary parity. Officials therefore
advised that the lead should be retained only as an
interim measure, pending efforts to align entry standards
for nurse training and conditions of employment. Inde-
pendent investigation of conditions at selected general
and psychiatric hospitals was not favoured.[57] By the
time the Royal Commission's other reports were consid-
ered, the incoming Labour government had set up its cau-
cus health committee. That committee was a convenient
mechanism to massage the official response to the Royal
Commission's thinking.[58,59] The Department con-
temptuously dismissed the proposed institute of psychia-
try as a 'grave risk of putting the clock back' and sought
solutions within general post-graduate medical educa-
tion. The proposal itself was referred to key agencies, but
their opposition was entirely predictable [60]. Faint praise
lavished on the report on mental handicap services as a
superficially 'clear, simple and logical answer' masked
caution about the impractical staffing implications. By the
time the official response was released, the caucus com-
mittee had already endorsed the department's proposals
for a moratorium on capital development and for a
national survey that effectively forestalled action on 12 of
the 20 recommendations of the third report. The Royal
Commission's other ideas were to be given further consid-
eration, particularly if they threatened current departmen-
tal responsibilities.[61]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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Ministerial Committee of Inquiry (1995–6)
By the 1990s, the heyday of the psychiatric hospital was
long past. Deinstitutionalisation was well underway in an
era of cost cutting. In its wake, public anxieties about poor
co-ordination among multiple service providers were
aroused by tragedies and led to some calls to bring back
traditional institutions. After police fatally shot an armed
man who had a history of mental illness in 1995, a Labour
Opposition Member of Parliament prepared a private
member's Bill to establish a full-scale inquiry. The govern-
ment contemplated a 'national task force' to address criti-
cisms, but the Prime Minister ruled out a 'big' inquiry
because it would only delay systemic improvements. After
another similar shooting, however, the government
swiftly ordered its own ministerial inquiry rather than
have one imposed by the Opposition through Parlia-
ment.[62,63] If improved service co-ordination and pub-
lic safety were the systemic issues for the inquiry in 1995,
there was also an element of political damage control.
The Ministerial Inquiry was the first to acknowledge the
country's bicultural heritage. The Chair was Judge KH
Mason, who has Ngäi Tahu tribal affiliations. He was also
an experienced inquiry chair, having conducted two pre-
vious mental health inquiries. One of these, the Commit-
tee of Inquiry into Procedures Used in Certain Psychiatric
Hospitals (1987–88), drew attention to the prominence
of Maori in the statistics of mental illness. The same
inquiry had other Maori members, a Maori secretary, and
a kaumatua (elder). But the composition of the 1995
inquiry differed from its predecessors in other ways. It had
the smallest membership (three) – the other members
being a woman lawyer and a senior field worker from a
major voluntary mental health service provider. It was the
only inquiry without a medical member. The Ministerial
Inquiry was unusual, too, in that its office was not based
in the capital city.
The Ministerial Inquiry blended formal written proce-
dures, informal discussions with selected parties, and site
visits in New Zealand and Victoria. Like the other inquir-
ies, this one undertook no independent scientific
research. Of the 720 submissions received, more than 400
came from individuals. Three times the number of sub-
missions was received than expected. Although it was
granted an extension of time, the Ministerial Inquiry com-
plained that members had less time to consider the large
volume of submissions than they would have wished.[64]
The traditional policy community was still represented
among these submissions, but a very large number came
from consumer, self-help, and support groups, and the
Mental Health Foundation as a general advocate for men-
tal health. There was also a distinct Maori voice. The
explosion of interest can probably be attributed to
Mason's earlier inquiry of 1987–8, which had been
enjoined to 'adopt procedures that encourage people to
participate in your proceedings'. Hearings therefore took
place at hospitals and prisons and on marae (traditional
Maori meeting grounds).[65]
The Ministerial Inquiry produced the largest report of the
five inquiries. Virtually half of it consists of direct quota-
tions from testimony and submissions. In presenting a
very human face to the problems of the mental health
services, the Inquiry made 'no apology for not substituting
our words for those of the submitters – that would be tan-
tamount to sanitising the objectivity of the submis-
sions.'[66] Mindful, perhaps, of the weight of 81
substantive recommendations made by Mason's 1987–88
inquiry, the Ministerial Inquiry made only five formal rec-
ommendations, though many suggestions were essen-
tially recommendations. These few formal
recommendations were held to be 'significant in their
potential impact'. The inquiry refrained from making 'a
raft' of detailed recommendations lest that be interpreted
as some indicator of efficiency and unless there was a real
expectation that they would be implemented.'[67]
The government's response must have confirmed the Min-
isterial Inquiry's suspicions about the lack of bureaucratic
and political will for change. The form of the recommen-
dations was retained, but not necessarily their substance.
Funding, for instance, was increased by $142.2 M. above
current levels, but nearly $60 M. had to be found from
within existing budgets. The government established the
Mental Health Commission as a 'tightly-focussed' body
with a 'watch-dog role', not as the quasi-department
envisaged by the Inquiry. The most likely explanation is
that the recommended body would have cut across the
prevailing management ideology of the policy-purchaser-
provider split. Just as important, it would have reduced
the Ministry's own claim to national leadership. The Min-
ister of Health, Jenny Shipley (1993–96), was satisfied
that doubling the staff within the ministry's mental health
group would 'significantly boost' the ministry's perform-
ance in providing policy advice and monitoring serv-
ices.[68] The ministry's policy leadership role was
enshrined in the same legislation that set up the Mental
Health Commission.[69] Far from the Minister's confi-
dent expectation that members of the inquiry would be
satisfied by the government's response, they quickly and
contemptuously condemned the bureaucratic med-
dling.[70]
Discussion
The five New Zealand general inquiries into mental health
have been undertaken about once a generation, or the
same frequency of general stock-takes of mental health
legislation. That pattern matches Simpson's findings on
public inquiries in other policy domains.[71] Two expla-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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nations might account for the infrequency of systemic
stock-takes. First, mental health policy serves multifaceted
social purposes of control, care and cure. Policy is com-
plex and it can be controversial because numbers of men-
tal disordered people are subject to involuntary detention,
assessment and treatment – the most commonplace use of
such powers in health legislation. Protecting fairly the
civil liberties and safety of the mentally disordered indi-
vidual, families and caregivers, and the public involve dif-
ficult medico-legal decisions. Ideology asserts a powerful
influence upon policy solutions. Mental health lacks high
status and popularity. Fickle public attitudes vary from
sympathy to stigma and stereotypes. Politicians prefer not
to disturb the basics of mental health policy. TF Gill, Min-
ister of Health (1975–8), suggested that 'the broad prob-
lems of mental health' can readily become matters for
rather pointless political controversy' unless skilfully han-
dled. He saw little merit in tying such issues to specific
political programmes.[72]
The nature of public policy-making and government
funding may also explain why advisory inquiries have
been held so infrequently. RJ Polaschek, a distinguished
New Zealand public servant, saw government as largely
incremental, with periodic bursts of activity when mar-
ginal adjustments fell short of public expectations.[73]
Mental health policy development in New Zealand, as
elsewhere, has been characterised by spasmodic bursts of
reform interspersed with long periods of stagnation or
neglect.[74-76] Major initiatives, general reviews of legis-
lation or services, significant organizational changes, and
significant injections of new funding mark booms in the
saga of New Zealand's national mental health policy [77].
The corresponding low points include the end of either a
long period of continuous government by one party, or
the incumbency of long-serving top officials.
The circumstances that surrounded the formation and fol-
low-up of every inquiry involved a mix of policy issue and
politics. Each inquiry was formed when a systemic policy
issue reached a level of political sensitivity and public sig-
nificance. An inquiry – or the threat of one – has created a
'climate for action' as Chapman puts it.[78] Prasser has
suggested that setting up a public inquiry may serve sev-
eral political purposes, including some that seem relevant
to the five mental health inquiries studied here. According
to Prasser, a public inquiry may elicit more specific infor-
mation to guide the government. It may help to define
policy problems more precisely or more acceptably at the
political level. An inquiry may provide a broader range of
policy options than might emerge from the public service.
An independent inquiry is a way to impartially review
existing arrangements, to resolve public controversy, or to
promote public participation and consensus. Prasser con-
siders that an inquiry can help a government to manage
the policy agenda by the illusion of action, deflection of
criticism, or co-option of critics.[79]
The authority, mandate, composition, procedure and
reporting style of the five inquiries reflect trends among
public inquiries generally. Parliament initiated the two
nineteenth century inquiries; the twentieth century
inquiries were instruments of the executive, a trend con-
sistent with the constitutional realignment in the state.
The main forms of inquiry are represented in the mental
health line-up, which points to the flexibility of the
device. All inquiries except the Ministerial Inquiry were
based in the capital city of the day.
Membership trends in the five inquiries are consistent
with those in inquiries generally. Each twentieth century
inquiry was chaired by a legal practitioner. AW Mackay
suggests that in Canada this convention creates 'instant
credibility and an aura of objectivity and independ-
ence'.[80] The size of inquiry teams has shrunk, although
New Zealand inquiries have generally been small by Brit-
ish standards.[81] The odd number of members in most
cases may have been intended to safeguard unanimity, as
Simpson contended.[82] Eminent citizens were chosen in
different combinations of regional, gender, professional/
lay and ethnic perspectives. It is interesting to note how
the number of medical practitioners has dropped except
for the Board of Health Committee, which was a technical
body. Sir Keith Holyoake's views, which were stated ear-
lier, reveal a 'romantic yearning for the commonsense
approach to the solution of social problems and a pro-
found distrust of professional expertise', as Borchardt sug-
gested in his analysis of inquiries in New South
Wales.[83] The Royal Commission and Ministerial
Inquiry best reflected what AR Prest termed the Noah's ark
principle or the trade-off of expertise, representativeness
and official acceptability.[84]
Each inquiry has considered and arbitrated among differ-
ent perspectives and shaped its thinking according to the
weight of evidence. Inquiries before 1957 consulted only
'interested parties', or the small circle of officials, agencies,
professionals, and industrial or professional associations
directly involved in providing psychiatric care. Such selec-
tive involvement has been superseded by the notion that
a public inquiry is an exercise in participative democracy.
Any interested organisation or person who responds to a
public advertisement can make a submission. Increased
public awareness and the proliferation of mental health
interest groups in recent years, thanks to administrative
devolution, deinstitutionalisation, and state sector
restructuring, is illustrated by the exponential growth in
the number of submissions made to the Ministerial
Inquiry from submissions received by the earlier inquir-
ies.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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The formality of proceedings has slowly been relaxed,
although all inquiries have kept a verbatim record or min-
utes of proceedings. Since the 1960s, inquiries have fol-
lowed a process of considering written submissions
followed up by public hearings, cross-examination by
other parties, and questioning by the inquiry team.[85]
The Ministerial Inquiry blended formal written proce-
dures, informal discussions with selected parties, and site
visits in New Zealand and Victoria.[86] None of the five
inquiries undertook an independent scientific research
programme.
All reports were unanimous, although the Board of Health
Committee narrowly averted a majority report. This fact
bears out Weller's observation that inquiries have a choice
of working entirely in the open (above stage), negotiating
(behind stage) or doing secret deals (below stage).[87]
Inquiries completed their task fairly quickly, although
timing was a problem in two cases. The truncation of the
Royal Commission was unique in New Zealand adminis-
trative history, though apparently not in the United King-
dom.[88]
An inquiry's 'sole legacy' is its report which, Hallett sug-
gested, is said to emit 'a more or less musty aroma.'[89]
Each inquiry presented a single report at the conclusion of
its proceedings, save for the Royal Commission, with
three reports. As a matter of custom rather than law, each
inquiry's report was published soon after it was presented.
By contrast with twentieth century reports, the select and
Joint Committee reports were remarkably concise. The
lengthier reports of twentieth century inquiries have sum-
marised and analysed the evidence in order to support the
findings and recommendations. The Ministerial Inquiry
produced the largest report of the five bodies.
Three general themes haunt the reports of the five mental
health inquiries. A self-evident wish to improve standards
of care and treatment points firstly to the limited impor-
tance of mental health over time in the overall priorities
of government. Intermittent public interest is insufficient
to resolve ongoing resource problems of adequate fund-
ing, specialist staffing, and proper facilities. The Minister
of Health, Jenny Shipley, said as much when she released
the report of the Ministerial Inquiry. 'Governments come
and go, ministers come and go – we've had a 20-to-25 year
problem where mental health has always been left last,'
she said.[90] The problem is actually far older, as New
Zealand's Inspector-General of Lunatic Asylums reported
in 1898:
The public are very exacting in their demands for the
proper treatment of the insane, but they are roused to
indignant clamour only when some painful occurrence
reveals the difficulties which their officers are daily con-
fronted with and almost despairingly struggle to over-
come. In the intervals, there is no sustained resolve that
their representatives shall provide the means of proper
classification and treatment.[91]
The role of the specialised institution in the care and treat-
ment of mental disorder is another recurrent theme. The
nineteenth century inquiries sought properly equipped
lunatic asylum(s). The twentieth century inquiries faced
the growing limitations of that investment in institutional
psychiatry. Adopting a less institutional approach, they
have recognised the need for effective co-ordination
among a growing range of services. The third theme con-
cerns the need for an effective national organisation and
accountability framework to provide clear direction and
leadership. This theme was most obvious in the inquiries
of 1871 and 1995–96.
Prest rightly suggests that an inquiry has the difficult task
of aiming its report somewhere between the rock of a
politically appealing set of recommendations and the
hard place of publication and damnation.[92] Salter
explains the same problem as the contradiction in a proc-
ess whereby an inquiry can incorporate quite radical
debate as well as quite limited, highly pragmatic and
reformist goals of producing specific policy recommenda-
tions.[93] The place of an inquiry's report on that contin-
uum of specificity depends upon several factors. For
instance, inquiries typically do not constrain their think-
ing within specified resource limits, so the financial cost
of recommendations may be too great. The political cost
of unusual or radical thinking may mean rejection, delay,
or further investigation. Moreover, changes in the political
environment between the inception and report of an
inquiry can significantly affect the outcome. Electoral mis-
fortune limited the effectiveness of the inquiries of 1858
and 1972–3. Cabinet reshuffles, another potentially dis-
ruptive political factor, did not disturb the other inquiries,
which completed their work under the same minister.
Bureaucratic influence, however, has exerted a powerful
mediating role. The nineteenth century inquiries encoun-
tered no national mental health bureaucracy, but the
three twentieth century inquiries show how the depart-
ment of state has acted to protect or promote its own
interests. Mutualism between ministers and officials is
intrinsic to Westminster constitutional systems and the
Whitehall/Wellington administrative systems, which may
help explain why the Department's long record in manag-
ing mental hospitals was not scrutinised by an inquiry
more often. Almost certainly such scrutiny would have
subjected administrators and their ministers to embarrass-
ment. The Royal Commission's hearings on psychiatric
services took place shortly after the transfer of mental hos-
pitals, a technicality that enabled departmental officials toAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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focus on the possibilities of the post-transfer environment
rather than the deficiencies of the past.
Departmental archives demonstrate the multiple roles of
the bureaucracy throughout the life of the Board of Health
Committee and the Royal Commission. Officials recom-
mended the establishment of the inquiry, drafted terms of
reference and nominated expert members – all activities
that fall within the normal range of advice to ministers.
The department provided the committee's secretariat and
that of the Royal Commission, again in line with accepted
practice.[94] The Ministerial Inquiry declined a similar
offer. The department provided basic factual information,
made submissions and gave evidence to each inquiry
since 1957. Inquiries have also provided a chance outside
the usual lines of accountability for officials to state their
concerns and to make their suggestions. The late Dr DP
Kennedy, Director-General of Health (1965–72), told me
at the time the Royal Commission was set up, that an
inquiry was one of the few occasions when a department
could fly its own kites.
Bureaucratic mediation, however, has been strongest in
advising ministers how to respond to an inquiry's report.
As ad hoc instruments of public administration, they play
no part in implementing their own ideas, a point that the
Ministerial Inquiry (and an earlier inquiry chaired by
Judge Mason) may not have understood. Their reports
proposed mechanisms to implement recommendations,
which indicated a lack of confidence in the depart-
ment.[95,96] Inquiries lack the organisational continuity,
institutional memory, technical expertise, and political
influence of a permanent departmental administration.
Bureaucratic influence is considerable in determining the
fate of recommendations when an inquiry's vision con-
verges with resource realism and political endorsement.
Table 1 shows a trail of discarded or severely modified rec-
ommendations that met a political and a financial cost or
priority too high to pay. This has often been as a major
weakness of the inquiry as an instrument of public policy-
making.[97-101]
Assessing the overall effectiveness of the five public
inquiries by the popular criterion of immediate imple-
mentation of a report's recommendations is problematic.
Such a unidimensional standard raises three important
questions that can be answered by examples from the five
inquiries. Does immediate mean a usable time when the
report of an inquiry retains some currency among deci-
sion-makers? Literal interpretation of 'immediate imple-
mentation' distorts the record of each inquiry. The 1858
inquiry, for instance, would score highly as considerable
progress was made towards implementing the basic rec-
ommendation about a general lunatic asylum. But the
foundation stone of such an institution was never laid let
alone its roof. Two years and a change of government
later, the practicality of building a national facility virtu-
ally disappeared. Similarly, account should be taken of
the vacillation of the governments between 1871–4 in
implementing the substantive recommendation of the
Joint Committee to appoint a national inspector. The rec-
ommendation was ultimately but not immediately imple-
mented. The staffing arrangements proposed for regional
psychiatric units by the Board of Health Committee were
initially implemented but abandoned only a few years
later.
Next, does implementation refer to the letter or the spirit
of recommendations? The capital moratorium imposed
by the Department far exceeded the Royal Commission's
recommendation. The form of the recommended Mental
Health Commission was retained in the follow-up to the
Ministerial Inquiry, but not the substance.
The third question is whether the standard of immediate
implementation should apply to all the recommenda-
tions or just the key ones. Not all recommendations are
equal and they can not be judged equally. Some recom-
mendations, however, were vague, sweeping, and had few
handles for implementation, for example:
That whilst steps should be taken to improve all Asylums
of the Colony, the state of that at Karori, near Wellington,
urgently requires immediate attention and reform.[102]
A dissemination of knowledge of the various types of
mental illness should lead to an early and more accurate
diagnosis of mental illness by general practitioners. Such
a general understanding, it is felt, may even prevent the
onset of mental illness and contribute to the maintenance
of good mental health....[103]
The specificity of some recommendations, however, like
many of those of the Royal Commission, may lend them-
selves more easily to immediate implementation. Yet any
list is likely to contain both key and derivative or second-
ary recommendations. An assessment of the Royal Com-
mission's work is also hampered by the fact that it did not
have the opportunity to complete its mandate.
The durable impact on mental health policy in New Zea-
land of the core ideas of each report is considerable. For
example, the parliamentary inquiries promoted the con-
cept of the ideal lunatic asylum. The ideal was never
attained in the concept of a single national institution, but
the same ideals underpinned the establishment of a net-
work of provincial asylums. The romance and nostalgia of
the ideal asylum could still be found in officialdom more
than a century later.[104] The 1858 inquiry also paved the
way for a comprehensive and stand-alone mental healthAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/24
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statute. That principle has been followed in every general
review of mental health legislation from the Lunatics Act
1868 to the present Mental Health (Compulsory Assess-
ment and Treatment) Act 1992. The third example
involves a specialised organisation within the machinery
of central government that would, inter alia, advise minis-
ters on policy, and monitor plans and policies. The Joint
Committee mooted that idea and the Ministerial Inquiry
upheld its importance. Fourth, two inquiries made a
major contribution to the modern policy of deinstitution-
alisation. The Board of Health Committee report expe-
dited the provision of acute psychiatric services outside of
mental hospitals. The Royal Commission's report on
mental handicap services led to the moratorium on capi-
tal development in all mental hospitals and to a national
survey of all patients in mental hospitals that was
intended to identify the need for alternative community
based services.
These durable effects fit what Le Dain terms the social
function of public inquiries which, he claims, is probably
more important in the long term than specific recommen-
dations:
What gives an inquiry ... its social function is that it
becomes, whether it likes it or not, part of this ongoing
social process. There is action and interaction.... Thus this
instrument ... may have a dimension which passes beyond
the political process into the social sphere. The phenome-
non is changing even whole the inquiry is in progress. The
decision to institute an inquiry of this kind is a decision
not only to release an investigative technique but a form
of social influence as well.[105]
The social role of inquiries has helped to widen the men-
tal health policy community far beyond the original
'establishment'. Participation in the proceedings of an
inquiry may engender a sense of social contribution to the
solution of problems. An investigatory inquiry can be
publicly cathartic.
Conclusion
Public inquiries are an accepted tool in the process of pub-
lic policy-making. They have played a direct and indirect
role in shaping mental health policy throughout the his-
tory of government in New Zealand and beyond that to
the British parliamentary inquiries of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. Although their utility will no
doubt continue to be debated, history shows that the pub-
lic inquiry – in both its advisory and investigative forms –
remains an important tool of public administration.
The reports provide valuable snapshots of the general
state of New Zealand's mental health services at different
stages of evolution. The effectiveness of any inquiry
should not be judged solely by the immediate acceptabil-
ity of its report. The cause-effect relationship may take
much longer. The report of an inquiry may be prophetic
but contribute to a climate of opinion that supports sub-
sequent change, maybe years later, long after any direct
causal link could be determined. Although implementa-
tion of an inquiry's findings and recommendations is
important in assessing its effectiveness, if we consider the
long-term impact of the core ideas of each report, the five
inquiries can be linked to several significant and long-
term contributions to mental health policy in New Zea-
land.
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